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This paper explores the dilemma of protected area buffer zone forest management, 
particularly in dealing with market roles that could contribute to poverty reduction. 
Examining Nepal’s buffer zone program, the paper shows how the reluctance to embrace the 
role of markets has undermined the poverty-reduction potential of buffer zone forests. It is 
revealed that conservationists’ persistent fear that access to markets may ultimately lead to 
overexploitation has shaped the buffer zone policies that often favor subsistence over forest 
product trade. It is demonstrated that constrained access to markets has hit the poor who rely 
more on markets for their livelihoods, which limits the poverty-reduction potentials of buffer 
zone forests. Weak forest tenure in buffer zones is at the core of the problem. It is argued that 
in the absence of effective local voices conservation authorities have largely enjoyed 
monopoly over the policy process that often gives inadequate attention to local livelihoods. It 
is suggested that increased tenure security and access to markets must be part of 
decentralization reform in order for the poor to benefit from forests.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The negative social impacts of protected areas (PAs) is now well recognized (Ghimire and 
Pimbert 1997; Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau 2004; Kothari 2004). However, the nature 
and extent of impacts on specific social groups and the complex dynamics of interactions 
between conservation policies and livelihood outcomes are still not fully understood. 
Consequently, policy responses in addressing conservation and livelihoods have not been able 
to meet these interrelated objectives.  
 
Buffer zone programs are hailed as one of the best approaches to address the poverty of the 
communities surrounding PAs. The program often combines natural resource decentralization 
and financial and technical support in implementing various integrated conservation and 
development projects. The outcomes in general are said to have been enhanced social status 
of local people and improved ecological condition of the area. Notwithstanding these 
achievements, there are mounting criticisms that the conception, design, and implementation 
of buffer zone programs have failed to meet their promises (Neumann 1997; Lynagh and 
Urich 2002; Paudel 2003, 2005). The central points of the critics are the expansion of the 
conservation agenda outside the PA boundary into communities, and inability to deliver the 
expected benefits to the poor and marginalized.    
 
Most of the criticism over buffer zone programs however is limited to the unequal distribution 
of development benefits, particularly on the disproportionate costs and benefits of 
conservation programs (Paudel 2005). While these criticisms are common to many rural 
development programs, the more fundamental issue is the status of forest tenure security and 
its impacts on landless, marginalized, and other poor communities in buffer zones. Tenure 
insecurity of forest products and associated restrictions to market access have often been 
overlooked within the macronarratives of natural resource decentralization in the buffer 
zones.  
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This paper examines Nepal’s buffer zone policy and practice to explore the effects of 
restrictive provisions in accessing the market for forest products. The paper draws from 
literature review, policy document analysis, individual consultations, and the author’s long 
observation of the buffer zone program in Nepal. The paper begins with the historical 
development of Nepal’s buffer zone program, examines its specific provisions, relates 
policies with the actual practices in the field, and analyzes the impacts of these restrictive 
provisions. The paper concludes by criticizing the stereotyped assumptions and arguments 
against the role of markets and suggests a more deliberative approach to realize the 
commercial benefits of forest products, particularly for the poor and landless.  
 
 
Livelihoods in Chitwan Valley and the Role of Markets 
 
In Nepal land is the predominant source of income, security, and social prestige (Shrestha and 
Conway 1996; Karki 2002). However, land distribution is highly skewed and thousands of 
people do not have enough land to cultivate. Over 20% of the people are landless. These 
people largely rely on forest and other commons or open access natural resources for their 
livelihoods. 
 
The situation is even worse in and around the Chitwan National Park. Indigenous people and 
landless households form a major portion of the population in Chitwan National Park’s buffer 
zone. They have settled on public lands including river banks and forest fringes. Among 
them, over 50% of the Bote and Musahar (1,153 households) largely rely on fishing that 
provides over 70% of their annual income. Collection of wild fruit and vegetables 
complements their household income. There are several other poor and landless groups in the 
area drawing their livelihoods by collecting and selling a number of forest products from the 
PA and the buffer zone. According to a recent study of two buffer zone villages, “landless 
people had by far the most collection activities and the land rich the fewest” (Straede and 
Treue 2006: p. 258).  
 
Only a small part of this collection (fishing, wild fruit, and vegetables) is directly consumed. 
The major portion is sold in the market both local and sometimes in Narayangarh—the main 
trading center in the valley—where items often fetch a better price. According to one study 
the gross value of collection equalled almost 90% of the total annual cash income for the 
households (Straede and Treue 2006: p. 262). This shows the degree of their reliance on the 
market for forest products.  
 
 
The Buffer Zone Program and Restricted Access to Markets  
 
The Nepalese Government introduced the buffer zone management program in 1996 as a 
measure to reduce the ongoing park–people conflict around the PAs. A periphery outside the 
PA’s border was designated as a buffer zone and the area was brought under the jurisdiction 
of the PA authority. Several land-use restrictions are imposed in the area and 30 to 50% of the 
PA income has been reinvested for socio-economic development of the area and for paying 
compensation against wildlife-related damages. A range of buffer zone institutions has been 
set up in implementing the program including managing the local forests. Buffer zone 
community forest user groups (CFUGs) are managing the forest in collaboration with the PA 
authority. These forests are handed over to the buffer zone CFUGs under the approved 
Operational Plans and the constitutions of the groups.  
 
Forest policies for the buffer zone have shown little consideration of the local livelihood 
contexts of the area. Management of forest resources is often limited to subsistence use by 
putting a number of direct and indirect restrictions on accessing markets. While management 
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responsibilities of buffer zone forests are handed over to the buffer zone CFUGs, they are not 
allowed to establish and operate any forest-based industries thereby preventing any 
commercial benefits. The Buffer Zone Rule 1996, (Rule 20:2) (HMGN/MOLJ, 1996) reads:  
 
Whatever is mentioned in the Sub-Rule (1), before registration or providing 
license for cottage industry based on forest resources, the official shall register 
or provide license for the operation of the industry only after getting approval 
of the Department [Department of National Park and Wildlife Conservation 
(DNPWC)]. 
 
Here the Government office responsible for registering the enterprise must take prior 
permission from the DNPWC, which is not an easy job. The DNPWC often discourages 
establishment of any forest-based industries in the buffer zone area. By centralizing the 
licensing procedure, the legal framework inhibits operation of forest-based industries in the 
buffer zones. Moreover, the Nepalese forest law, which applies across the country, including 
PA buffer zones, restricts the establishment of any forest-based enterprise within one 
kilometer of a forest area.  
 
The same rule restricts movement of forest products outside the buffer zone where they may 
incur high price. In this aspect the Rule (21:12) reads:   
 
Users’ will be allowed to transport forest products, except timber and firewood 
obtained under the Sub-Rule (10) and (11) from the buffer zone. Users will 
have to obtain permission from the warden before making such transportation. 
 
Not very surprisingly, these restrictions equally apply for private forests (Rule 23:4):  
 
If the owner of buffer private forest has to transport, sale or distribute the 
forest products of buffer private forest out side the buffer zone, will have to 
apply to the warden with the description of species, kind, and quantity of the 
forest products. 
 
Here one can observe the two-pronged restrictions in realizing the commercial value of the 
forest products; forest enterprises cannot be established in the buffer zone nor can they be 
transported outside the area. This legal provision indicates a strong bias against any form of 
trade or marketing of forest products. Interestingly, these restrictions are not only limited to 
the periodic harvest of standing trees or other forest products, it also applies to the flood 
driftwood that often comes from hundreds of kilometers away. The Rule even restricts 
collecting of flood driftwood during floods in Narayani and Rapti. The Rule (24:7) mentions  
 
The warden himself or through the users committee may collect the wood or 
firewood that are drifted, edged or trapped or submerged on the river bank 
within the buffer zone …… makes arrangement for sale depots and 
……prescribes the rates based on existing laws. 
 
And these woods will not be permitted to be used outside the buffer zone. 
 
In this way the current buffer zone rules strictly prohibit the movement and trade of forest 
products outside the buffer zone. The rationale of these restrictions and their existing and 
potential livelihood outcomes are discussed hereunder.  
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The Poor Are the Losers  
 
The stereotyped assumption that the rural poor rely on natural resources for subsistence use 
may have played an important role in shaping policies that inhibit market access. In Nepal 
rural livelihoods are generally linked with subsistence use. While this may be true to some 
extent for the peasant farmers, this is largely untrue for the poorest households. These 
assumptions show a lack of understanding of the rural economy in general and that of the 
landless and poor in particular. Consequently, the spatial restrictions imposed upon the 
movement of forest products have barred poor people from realizing the benefits from 
markets. The following case from one of the buffer zone villages reveals the nature of the 
problem.  
 
Laugain Khar-Khadai 
 
Many local elites have united with PA authorities to impose strict conservation priorities in 
the buffer zone forests. These strict measures in limiting the movement of biomass within the 
buffer zone have had negative impacts on disadvantaged people as illustrated by the following 
case. The poor people in Laugain, one of the buffer zone villages worked hard for two weeks 
to collect thatch grass and fuelwood during the annual khar-khadai2 harvest in February 1999. 
They did not engage in wage labor during this time but bought daily food and other 
consumables on credit from the local shop. They were expected to pay their bills by selling 
the thatch grass that would be collected during the permitted period. At the end of the grass-
cutting period they were seeking customers to buy their harvest. Meanwhile the buffer zone 
CFUG chairperson issued a public notice prohibiting the sale of the grass outside the village. 
The collectors were furious at the notice and held a protest rally against the decision. They 
were so angry that they tried to beat the chairperson, however, he escaped. Later, he defended 
the decision based on the provision of the buffer zone rule that restricts movement of forest 
products outside the buffer zone area. As a consequence of this restriction the collectors were 
compelled to sell their grass locally at NRs2 per bundle while outsiders were ready to pay 
NRs.4 per bundle. Rich local farmers bought the grass at the cheaper rate and benefited from 
the provision. The Sukumbasis (landless people who rely on the sale of grass) questioned the 
biased rationality of the buffer zone rules. If tonnes of rice and other farm products from the 
area can be sold to Kathmandu and Pokhara, leaving thousands of poor people starving in the 
neighborhoods, why could the Sukumbasis not sell their grass?  
 
Conservationists have a deep fear that given the stark scarcity of natural resources outside the 
buffer zone, opening up of markets for natural resources may result in siphoning of them 
(Sharma, personal communication). For some time, conservationists have expressed grave 
concerns over the subsistence use of forest resources such as thatch grass, fodder, and grazing 
in the area (Straede and Helles 2000). In many cases, the Nepalese conservationists have 
struggled to address the concerns of their international counterparts (Bhatt, personal 
communication). This is also reflected in the Nepal Government’s report to the World 
Heritage Site Convention which states: “Collection of thatch grass in the park by villagers is 
well controlled and is not seen as a negative impact” (HMG 2003). These global concerns and 
conventional narratives are to a large extent responsible for shaping the policies that are 
hostile to any commercial use of forest resources.  
 
There are genuine sustainability concerns that opening up markets for biomass in and around 
the park may lead to overexploitation of resources. This might be particularly true when there 
is a huge gap in resource availability between buffer zones and outside them. Learning from 
the resource management patterns of local and indigenous institutions we can develop 
institutions that ensure the sustainable extraction of resources and benefit the poorest groups. 
                                                 
2 A term collectively used to mean thatch grass and building material from Imperata cylindrica. 
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Establishment and development of such institutions should be the challenge for ensuring 
market benefits without compromising ecological integrity.  
 
Much consumptive use can be allowed without significant negative impact on the PA 
ecosystem (flood driftwood, riverine grass, wild fruit and vegetables). Local people have not 
well understood why they have been barred from picking ripe wild fruit or seasonal leafy 
vegetables. Conservationists would say that the ripe fruit will be eaten by birds or small 
animals as part of the long food chain. So in absolute terms every forest product in the park is 
essentially part of the local ecosystem. But in pragmatic terms, some forest products can be 
collected according to their regenerative capacity following the principle of sustainable use. 
For example, driftwood, which has floated hundreds of kilometers along rivers and is destined 
for the Indian border has little to contribute to park biodiversity.  
 
Restriction on cutting thatch grass is another activity that has been contested. First, most of 
the area covered by riverine grass belongs to the floodplains of the Narayani River, which is 
regularly irrigated by nutrient-rich floods. The nature and frequency of these floods are the 
major determinants of the regenerative capacity of the grass. With the current level of annual 
floods, grass cutting would have very little negative impact on it. Second, the regular cutting 
of grass allows fresh regeneration of palatable grass that attracts rhinos. Local people have 
observed that when grass cutting was not allowed, the grassland could not provide palatable 
grass for rhinos so that they tended to leave the PA for cropped fields. Third and a corollary to 
the previous fact, when grass cutting is stopped, the riverine grassland degenerates into old 
dying fields that are avoided by a large number of herbivores, therefore changing the whole 
food chain in the park.  
 
Given the ecological specificity of the area, grass cutting can be operated in a sustainable 
manner as long as local mechanisms for this are established and developed. If this is the case 
then what is wrong with selling the grass to the market? And why should the landless (in the 
aforesaid case from Laugain) be prevented from benefiting from the sale of grass?  
 
Buffer zone policies on forest management that limit access to markets can be largely 
attributed to the persistent unequal power relations between conservation lobbies and local 
communities. Even within the broad framework of participatory approaches to natural 
resource management, local people in Chitwan Valley complain that their concerns and 
voices have often been undermined. Although multistakeholder meetings have become the 
dominant fashion today these forums are often hijacked by Government representatives or the 
local elite. The pro-conservation agenda of discussion, the physical arrangements for the 
meetings, and use of technical language often have disempowering effects on local people. 
Moreover, many well-informed and resourceful people often control the discussion in 
multistakeholder forums that usually reduces the ability of local people to effectively 
communicate their views and concerns. In the absence of well-organized alternative 
proposals, the conservationist view prevails over that of the common people and ultimately 
translates into conservation policy around the PAs in Nepal.  
 
These conservative forest policies in the buffer zone are, however, challenged by the market 
actors who are highly influential in securing their interests. For example, despite 
conservationists’ serious concerns over the huge pressure of visitors in the park, PA 
authorities have been unable to put an effective mechanism in place to regulate visitor flow. 
Similarly, the PA authorities have been helpless in controlling the continued release of 
industrial effluents from the Bhrikuti Paper Mill and Hetauda Cement Factory into the park’s 
rivers, despite their known devastating impacts on the park’s ecology. It can be concluded that 
the poor and marginalized groups have not been able to make their legitimate concerns heard 
due to their weak social and political position. In other words, these top-down policies will 
continue to persist as long as the different competing views do not get opportunities to 
express themselves.  
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Conclusion  
 
The decentralization of natural resource management in the buffer zone program has been 
incomplete due to its restrictive policies in accessing the market to sell forest products. The 
policies and practices have favored subsistence use against enterprise and trading. Two 
implicit assumptions are evident: (1) the rural poor rely more on subsistence use and they 
have little interest in interacting with the market; (2) opening up of markets leads to 
unsustainable use of natural resources, threatening the sustainability of the PAs. Both 
arguments are based on global agendas and unexamined assumptions, which are found to be 
baseless under close scrutiny. First, poor and landless people residing in the area heavily rely 
on market transactions of natural resources for their livelihoods. Second, several forest 
products can be sustainably harvested according to the regenerative capacity of the area. 
Limiting the use of natural resources has negative impacts specifically on the poor and 
landless. This is contrary to the expressed objective of reducing poverty in the buffer zones.  
 
Only well-organized opposition, particularly by poor and landless people will challenge the 
current policies and bring their agenda forward. This would lead to a relatively balanced 
debate between competing views and perspectives, which can lead to negotiated policy 
outcomes that examine the role of markets and the sustainability issues in the local context.  
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